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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study we provide insight into how CEOs aggregate information from different sources to 
accurately forecast earnings by examining the relation between CEO networks and management 
forecast accuracy. We find that larger CEO networks improve the accuracy of firm’s earnings 
forecasts. Our results are robust to controlling for CEO ability and using CEO fixed effects. We 
also find that the relation between CEO network size and forecast accuracy is strongest for 
connections with insiders and individuals from the same industry and when the firm’s earnings 
have a relatively high correlation with the industry and macro economy, when there is a greater 
degree of underlying uncertainty, and industry competition is high. These results suggest that 
CEOs are able to use their contacts to better identify industry and economy-wide trends. Overall, 
our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence regarding how CEOs obtain 
information from external sources to improve their forecast accuracy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
An important topic in accounting research is to understand how management obtains and 
processes information to form their earnings expectations as disclosed to the public in the form of 
an earnings forecast. In this study, we add to this literature by investigating how a CEO’s network 
of personal and professional contacts, a potentially important source of external information, 
impacts management forecast accuracy. We first examine whether the size of a CEO’s network 
(personal, professional or educational) is associated with increased accuracy. Second, we focus on 
the CEO’s professional contacts and examine the types of contacts and environmental 
circumstances under which external information sources are likely to be most helpful. By 
providing empirical evidence on these issues, our study provides insight into the factors that 
determine the quality of financial information disseminated by the firm.  
 To address these questions, we use network data compiled by BoardEx to construct 
measures of the size of the CEO’s network contacts. Our procedure generates broad measures that 
capture the spread of personal relationships that could provide access to external information and 
perspectives that could help the CEO more accurately forecast future earnings. Prior literature 
suggests that social and professional interactions promote knowledge transfer (Glaeser, Kallal, 
Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1992, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993). Following this theory, 
individuals that have a larger network of personal or professional connections are more likely to 
share information to develop a better understanding of how fluctuating business circumstances 
influence their firm’s cost structure and product demand. This should enable them to more 
effectively anticipate future changes to the economic environment. We therefore expect that a 
CEO’s network is likely to provide access to a broader set of information that would allow the 
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firm to generate more accurate expectations regarding future financial performance. For example, 
a CEO with a larger network could have more formal or informal interactions with executives in 
the same industry. This would allow the executive to obtain perspective from a larger number of 
individuals and to use the broader set of information to derive a better understanding of industry 
or macro level trends and better forecast their firm’s financial performance. Therefore, we expect 
a positive relation between the size of a CEO’s network and the accuracy of the firm’s earnings 
forecast.1 
 On the other hand, a CEO has access to internal information through the firm’s internal 
information system that may capture the relevant information.2 Thus, it is not clear that personal 
contacts provide information incremental to the firm’s internal information system. In addition, a 
larger network may not necessarily represent a better network. A smaller, more focused 
manageable network of trusted individuals could also allow the CEO obtain high quality 
information.3 
Therefore, the relation between CEO network size and management forecast accuracy is 
an empirical issue that we investigate in this study. We test our hypothesis on a sample of 19,636 
quarterly management forecasts issued from 2001-2013 and find a significant negative relation 
between the CEO’s network size and absolute forecast error. This evidence suggests that a broader 
network allows the CEO to obtain information from external sources incremental to the firm’s 
internal information system that improves management’s ability to anticipate future economic 
                                                  
1 Appendix A provides additional detail regarding the BoardEx database and a specific example of the composition of 
a CEO network. 
2 Ke, Li, Ling, and Zhang (2018) provide evidence that social connections among executives improve information 
exchanges within the executive team. 
3 There is also evidence that a broader network increases CEO entrenchment and power (Fracassi and Tate 2012, and 
El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik 2015). If stronger corporate governance leads to higher quality disclosure and more 
accurate forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005, and Hui and Matsunaga 2015), 
then a larger network could lead to less accurate forecasts by increasing the CEO’s power within the corporate 
governance system. 
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performance.4 Our finding is robust to a series of alternative specifications including using CEO 
fixed and random effects, and controlling for CEO ability for the subset of firms for which the data 
are available (Demerijian, Lev, and McVay 2012). 
We next investigate the types of network contacts that are most useful in reducing forecast 
error. Specifically, we identify network contacts whose primary employer is in the same industry 
as the CEO’s firm and contacts that are classified as an insider (executive or senior manager) for 
their employer firm (Engelberg et al. 2013). We find that network contacts with individuals within 
the same industry and contacts with individuals classified as insiders have a stronger relation with 
forecast error than contacts with individuals from other industries or outside directors. This 
suggests that an individual affiliated with a firm in the same industry, or classified as an insider 
with their firm, is more likely to provide information that can be useful for forecasting future 
earnings (Engelberg et al. 2013).    
Finally we investigate conditions under which external information is most likely to be 
useful in improving earnings expectations. First, we find that network contacts are more useful 
when the firm’s earnings are more highly correlated with earnings at the industry or macro levels 
and less useful when the firm’s earnings tend to be more idiosyncratic. This evidence suggests that 
network connections facilitate the transfer of industry or economy-wide information that allows 
the CEO to derive a more accurate expectation of future earnings. Second, we find network 
contacts to be most effective in reducing forecast error when there is more underlying uncertainty, 
as measured by analyst forecast dispersion. This result is consistent with managers using their 
network to resolve high degrees of uncertainty. Finally, we find the relation between network 
                                                  
4 In additional tests (untabulated), we find a positive relation between CEO network size and both forecast frequency 
and horizon. These results support the view that the CEOs’ network connections allow CEOs to keep the market 
abreast of fluctuations in their ﬁrms’ economic factors on a timely basis. 
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contacts and forecast error to be strongest when industries are most competitive. This is consistent 
with CEOs obtaining external information when their firm’s performance is most likely to be 
affected by the performance of competitor firms. 
In summary, we find that larger CEO networks are associated with lower management 
forecast errors. This supports the view that network contacts facilitate the transfer of economic 
information from external sources that allows CEOs to derive more accurate expectations of future 
earnings. In addition, we find evidence that contacts within the industry and from insiders allow 
the CEO to better forecast their firm’s future performance. Finally, we find that such information 
is most useful when earnings are more highly correlated with the industry and macro economy, 
uncertainty is high, or competition is high. Our results are robust to using firm CEO fixed-effects, 
random effects and controlling for CEO ability. 
The conclusions from our study are consistent with and add further support for the findings 
reported by Schabus (2018) who find that board centrality improves management forecast 
accuracy. Similar to Schabus (2018) our findings suggest that external information sources can 
improve management’s projections of the firm’s financial performance. Our paper expands on that 
finding by providing evidence that the individual CEO can use external information from his/her 
personal contacts to improve their earnings projections and by providing evidence regarding the 
types of contacts and circumstances under which the contacts are most useful.5 
More broadly our study contributes to the general literature on voluntary disclosure and 
management forecasts by showing that the extent of the individual’s network connections is one 
of the individual specific factors, documented by Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) and Brochet, 
                                                  
5 As discussed below, we focus on the CEO position, as opposed to the board. In addition, the measure of centrality 
weights contacts by their “closeness” to the firm, where we weight each relationship equally. In untabulated tests we 
include a control for board centrality and find that our results are qualitatively similar. 
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Faurel, and McVay (2011), that influences the CEO’s voluntary disclosure effectiveness. Our 
findings also extend the findings in Baik et al. (2011) who show that CEO’s of higher ability have 
greater forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that an extensive network allows CEOs that have 
lower ability scores to use the information derived from their contacts to improve their forecast 
accuracy.  
Our study also contributes to the burgeoning literature on the impact of CEO networks on 
firm value. Studies document evidence of a potentially negative effect in that CEO’s with more 
network connections are more entrenched (Hwang and Kim 2009, Fracassi and Tate 2012, and El-
Khatib et al. 2015). The literature has also documented negative effects from relationships between 
an acquirer and target (Ishii and Xuan 2014), customer and supplier (Chen, Levy, Martin, and 
Shalev 2014), the audit committee and the firm’s auditor (He, Pittman, and Wu 2014), and the 
connectedness of the firm’s audit committee and financial reporting quality (Intintoli, Kahle, and 
Zhao 2018). In contrast, Cai and Sevilir (2012) present evidence that relationships between the 
acquirer and target are associated with higher returns from acquisitions. Engleberg, Gao, and 
Parsons (2012) also show that relationships between management and lenders lower borrowing 
costs, and Brown and Drake (2014) document evidence that boards that have ties to low-tax firms 
also pay lower tax rates. Similarly, Chao, Kubick, Miletkov, and Wintoki (2017) provide evidence 
that directors connected to firms domiciled in tax havens pay lower tax rates. Our evidence 
suggests that the CEO’s network connections can also have a positive impact by providing 
management with economic information from external sources that allows them to generate more 
accurate expectations of future financial performance.  
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II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior literature suggests that personal connections and relationships can enhance economic 
productivity by facilitating the transfer of information between economic agents. Jaffe et al. (1993) 
show that patent citations tend to be related to the geographic proximity of the original patent filing, 
which suggests that a greater degree of geographic concentration enhances knowledge spillover 
(Glaeser, Kallal, Sheinkman, and Shleifer 1992). Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen et al. (2010) 
present evidence that common educational ties between corporate management and mutual fund 
managers and sell-side analysts, respectively, enhance the transmission of firm-specific financial 
information. There is also evidence that individuals who have relationships with managers or 
directors of different firms tend to follow common policies.  For example, board interlocks are 
related to option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby 2009), earnings management (Chiu, 
Teoh, and Tian 2013), acquisition activity (Haunschild 1993), and private equity transactions 
(Stuart and Yim 2010). Similarly, Brown and Drake (2014) find that firms with a greater extent of 
ties with boards of low tax firms tend to have low tax rates themselves.  
One implication of this research is that CEOs who have a larger network of professional, 
educational, or social contacts with other executives and directors have access to a greater pool of 
information. Such individuals could use the information to improve their understanding of the 
economic environment faced by their firm and better map how the firm’s cost structure and product 
markets are going to be affected by anticipated changes to the economic environment. Individual 
economic agents are likely to have idiosyncratic information sets and beliefs regarding future 
economic activity. The larger the network, the broader the range of sources and the greater the 
impact of aggregation in reducing the noise associated with the individual, idiosyncratic 
perspectives of any single source. In addition, a larger network is likely to increase the likelihood 
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that the CEO will have a high quality source that provides useful information that would allow the 
CEO to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.6   
However, it is not clear that a broader set of contacts will improve the quality of the CEO’s 
information. CEOs have access to internally generated information that they can use to form their 
expectations. Thus, the information gained from network contacts may be subsumed by the CEO’s 
internal information for forming earnings expectations. Prior studies have generally focused on 
information transferred from insiders to analysts and traders, indicating that the managers’ 
information set is superior to that possessed by outside investors. In addition, it isn’t clear that a 
broader network provides more information than a smaller, more focused network. In a smaller 
network, the CEO may have stronger relationships and more active communication with those 
selected individuals in their network. 
A larger network could also impair forecast accuracy by increasing the CEO’s power 
within the firm thereby strengthening entrenchment and reducing management’s incentives to 
provide accurate forecasts. El-Khatib et al. (2015) develop an aggregate measure of the CEO 
network, referred to as “network centrality” and find that it is related to poor merger performance. 
This is consistent with the findings of Ishii and Xuan (2014) who find that acquirer/target social 
ties are associated with poor acquisition decisions. Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that CEO/Board 
network ties are associated with lower firm value and Hwang and Kim (2009) find that social ties 
between the CEO and Board impair the independence and effectiveness of the board. Prior research 
also provides evidence that stronger corporate governance encourages managers to increase 
forecast accuracy (Ajinkya et al. 2005). 
                                                  
6 Because communications between the CEO and network contacts are private and often informal, public disclosures 
providing direct, if anecdotal, evidence of specific examples of information transfer are not available. Therefore, 
following the current literature, we base our inferences on broad, indirect measures of the CEO’s network. 
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Most relevant to our study, Schabus (2018) finds that board centrality is positively related 
to forecast accuracy. Schabus’ (2018) results suggest that interlocked boards enhance the 
transmission of economic information to management that allows them to improve their forecast 
accuracy. While Schabus considers the board of directors, and connections with between firms, 
we focus on the individual officer generally held responsible for the accuracy of the forecast, the 
CEO, and the number of personal contacts for the individual. In addition to providing an interesting 
and intuitive measure of the CEO’s network, the use of the number of contacts as our variable 
allows us to investigate the types of contacts that are most valuable in providing economic 
information that the CEO can use to reduce their forecast error. 
Although other officers, such as the CFO, have input in forming the earnings forecast we 
focus on the CEO because that individual is the firm’s primary representative interacting with 
external parties and is most likely to sit on outside boards and discuss economic affairs with top 
executive officers and directors of other firms. In addition, there is empirical evidence that the 
CEO is held responsible for setting the firm’s disclosure policies and earnings forecasts. Lee, 
Matsunaga and Park (2012) find evidence that CEO turnover following poor performance is 
positively related to managerial forecast error. Brochet et al. (2011) provide evidence that CEO 
turnover influences the firm’s disclosure policies, and Hui and Matsunaga (2015) find a positive 
relation between forecast accuracy and CEO pay.7   
                                                  
7 Brochet et al. (2011) and Hui and Matsunaga (2015) provide evidence that the CFO is also involved in setting the 
firm’s earnings forecast. While the CFO’s network could also be relevant, consistent with prior literature, we form 
our network variable using the BoardEx Director database. As CFOs are less likely to serve as directors, they are 
under represented in the database. In our sample approximately 10 percent of CFOs have networks from director 
positions. We therefore focus on the CEO network and leave the network effects associated with other officers to 
future research. 
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Based on the above discussions regarding the effect of CEO networks on forecast accuracy, 
we posit the following hypotheses: 
H1: The extent of a CEO’s network is negatively related to absolute managerial forecast 
error. 
 
While the foregoing hypothesis treats each network connection equally, our next set of 
hypotheses investigates the types of contacts that are most likely to provide useful information.  
First, we expect contacts with individuals who work in the same industry to have a greater degree 
of knowledge about the competitive environment of the industry (threats from entrants or potential 
substitute products), technological innovations in the industry, costs of complying with industry 
regulations, etc., that could impact the firm’s future earnings. Second, an individual who serves as 
an insider, i.e., an executive or senior manager, for their employer firm is likely to have more 
information regarding their firm and its competitive environment than a non-insider and an 
individual affiliated with a firm in the same industry is likely to have more relevant information 
than an individual affiliated with a firm in a different industry (Engelberg et al. 2013).  
While individuals affiliated with the same industry or holding insider positions are likely 
to possess more useful information, it is not clear that they would be willing to share information 
with a rival firm. In addition, individuals who are not insiders or from other industries may be able 
to provide a broader, more global perspective and information that is less likely to overlap with 
the information the CEO obtains from its internal information system. We therefore state the 
following set of hypotheses in null form:  
H2A: CEO contacts with individuals employed in the same industry have the same 
relation with absolute managerial forecast error as contacts with individuals employed 
by firms in different industries. 
 
H2B: CEO contacts with insiders have the same relation with absolute managerial 
forecast error as contacts with outsiders. 
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 Our final set of hypotheses investigates the conditions under which external information 
sources would be most valuable. First, we expect external information to be most useful when a 
firm’s earnings are more associated with industry and economy wide earnings. In contrast, when 
earnings are more idiosyncratic, the CEO is likely to rely more heavily on their internal information 
system. Second, we expect external information to be most valuable when the underlying 
uncertainty regarding earnings is greater. For example, a high level of disagreement between 
analysts with regard to future earnings is likely to indicate the firm’s sensitivity to volatile 
underlying economic conditions. In such a case, a CEO is more likely to seek out and rely on 
external information sources to form their earnings expectation, Finally, we expect external 
information to be most valuable when the firm operates in a more competitive industry. In a 
competitive industry the firm’s financial performance is more highly tied to the actions of other 
firms in the industry. In such cases, information external information regarding the plans and 
outlook of competitor firms would be most useful in assessing the CEO’s firm’s financial 
performance. This leads to our next set of hypotheses: 
H3A: The relation between the size of the CEO’s network and absolute managerial 
forecast error is stronger when the firm’s earnings are more highly correlated with the 
overall industry or overall economy. 
 
H3B: The relation between the size of the CEO’s network and absolute managerial 
forecast error is stronger when the underlying uncertainty regarding future earnings is 
greater. 
 
H3C: The relation between the size of the CEO’s network and absolute managerial 
forecast error is stronger when the competition in the firm’s industry is stronger. 
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III. Empirical Design and Results 
Sample and Key Variable Definitions 
Our sample consists of 19,636 management forecasts issued from 2001 – 2013. We obtain 
management forecast data from FirstCall and IBES, the CEO network data from BoardEx, and 
firm financial data from Compustat.8 Our analysis is conducted on a firm-quarter basis. The control 
variables are measured as of the beginning of the quarter in which the forecast is issued.  Our 
dependent variable is Forecast Error, measured as the absolute value of forecast error deflated by 
price (i.e., |actual earnings less management forecast|/price), multiplied by 100. 
Network Size 
We derive our network size variables from the BoardEx database. The database includes 
biographical information on over 400,000 executives and board members. To construct their 
database, BoardEx collects CVs from board members of public and private firms from major 
countries around the world. BoardEx codes information derived from the CVs, such as the 
individual’s employment and educational histories, to form a comprehensive database that allows 
them to generate a network for each individual captured in their database.9  
We use the database to form our network variables as follows.  
                                                  
8 Since FirstCall coverage ends 2010, we augment FirstCall by using IBES after 2010 and adding additional forecasts 
from IBES before 2010. 
9 We provide additional information regarding the BoardEx database and the construction of the network variable in 
Appendix A. Our sample consists of CEOs of public firms that are covered by FirstCall and IBES. 
Network_Total = The log of summation of Network_Employment, Network_Education, 
and Network_Social 
Network_Emp = The log of summation of the CEO's employment ties. An employment 
tie occurs if the CEO currently or has historically overlapped with 
another executive or director 
Network_Edu = The log of summation of the CEO’s educational ties. An educational 
tie occurs if the CEO went to the same university at the same time with 
another executive or director 
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============= 
Insert Table 1 
============= 
Table 1 presents descriptive data regarding CEO network size. Panel A of Table 1 presents 
the mean value for each network variable by network size quartile, along with aggregate statistics. 
The mean (median) number of total network contacts is 369.2 (225). The mean (median) number 
of total employment contacts, educational contacts, and social contacts, is 261 (122), 101.9 (46), 
and 6.3 (0), respectively.10  
To provide a sense of how individuals develop large numbers of contacts, we evaluate the 
number of companies each CEO has worked for by total network size quartile.11 The description 
                                                  
10 We use the framework from Engelberg et al. (2013) to classify contacts. However, we calculate network contacts 
directly from the BoardEx network data whereas Engelberg et al. (2013) compiled network contacts from the BoardEx 
director profile data. We found that many social activities from profile data do not have proper dates and social contacts 
that do not consider dates could over-estimate the social network. Another disadvantage is that Engelberg et al. (2013) 
only counts educational contacts if one graduated within a year with the same degree, which might under-estimate the 
educational network. 
11 We count the number of companies each CEO worked for in the past or is working for currently in any capacity (i.e. 
executives or managers). The number of companies is calculated using firms in the BoardEx network data (Companies 
that are not covered by the database are therefore not included in the network.). In calculating board membership in 
Panel C, we count the number of director positions each CEO served in the past or is serving currently on boards of 
directors excluding his/her own company. 
Network_Soc = The log of summation of the CEO’s social ties. A social tie occurs if 
the CEO participated in a same social organization (e.g., charity or 
recreational club) at the same time with another executive or director 
Same_Industry = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties to individuals 
who are affiliated with firms in the same 2-digit SIC 
Different_Industry = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties to individuals 
affiliated with firms that are not in the same 2-digit SIC 
Insider = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties with individuals 
who are classified as executive directors and non-board managers such 
as CEO, COO, CFO, President, Vice-President, or Division Manager  
Outsider = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties with non-
executive directors who are typically classified as an independent 
outsider 
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in Panel B shows that 14.4% of the CEOs in the smallest CEO network quartile have not worked 
for another company in the database. This drops to 0.8% for CEOs in the highest CEO network 
quartile. Similarly, 61.1% of the CEOs in the lowest network size quartile have worked for three 
or more companies, whereas 98.1% of the CEOs in the highest network size quartile have worked 
for three or more companies. Thus, one way for a CEO to expand their employment network is to 
change firms. When an individual moves to another firm, they add the executive officers and board 
to their network, while retaining their contacts to the board members and executive officers of their 
former firm. 
Panel C of Table 1 presents the proportions of board memberships by total CEO network 
quartile. The results are similar. About 12.3% of the CEOs in the smallest total network quartile 
have served on two or more boards excluding their own companies. On the other hand, in the 
highest network quartile 54.8% serve on two or more boards. Thus, CEOs build employment 
networks by serving on boards of directors. 
Finally, we examine the number of degrees held by CEOs. Panel D of Table 1 shows that 
90.5% of CEOs in the lowest total network size quartile do not hold a graduate degree. That 
proportion declines to 48.2% for CEOs in the highest total network size quartile. This suggests 
that CEOs can expand their educational network by obtaining advanced degrees, where they are 
likely to overlap with other executives and board members. 
Note that our theory does not imply that CEOs interact with all of the individuals in their 
network. Instead, individuals who have a larger network are more likely to have access to key 
informed individuals who can provide valuable input into the CEO’s expectations model. In 
addition, individuals with a broader network are more likely to have access to multiple sources 
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and perspectives that they can then aggregate to reduce idiosyncratic noise and thus provide a more 
precise estimate of future economic performance. 
  
Other Variables 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the other variables used in our analysis. We 
provide a detailed description of each variable in Appendix B. Panel A of Table 2 presents the 
aggregate statistics for the full sample and Panel B of Table 2 provides the mean values for each 
total network size quartile. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean absolute forecast error is 0.36% 
of the price per share, the mean CEO tenure approximately five years and the mean CEO age is 
approximately 53.9 year-old. When we separate the data by CEO network size quartile we find 
that forecast error steadily declines with network size quartile. This is consistent with the 
contention that forecast error decreases with CEO network size.12 
============= 
Insert Table 2 
============= 
We present the pairwise correlations between key variables in Table 3.13  Consistent with 
the contention that CEOs use information gained from networks to develop more accurate 
estimates of future earnings, each of the network variables, is significantly negatively associated 
with the absolute management forecast error. The negative correlation between total network size 
and CEO tenure is consistent with individuals generating more network connections if they work 
for multiple firms. We also find that CEOs with larger networks tend to work for larger firms, with 
                                                  
12 In our reported tests we control for size by taking the log. Because the log-linear functional form may not be 
appropriate, in unreported tests we use different functional forms, such as including a quadratic size term, and using 
size quartile indicator variables. The results are qualitatively similar. 
13 For brevity we report the correlations for the key test variables and suppress the correlations between the control 
variables.  The remaining correlations are available from the authors upon request. 
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a greater degree of growth opportunities, a greater analyst following, and a greater degree of 
institutional ownership.  
============= 
Insert Table 3 
============= 
Test of the Relation between CEO Network Size and Forecast Accuracy 
Our first hypothesis (H1) investigates the relation between total network size and 
management forecast accuracy.  To test the hypothesis, we estimate the following regression. 
Forecast_Error = 0 + 1Network_Total + 2Tenure + 3Age+ 4Inst_Own  
                            + 5Ind_Directors + 6Num_Analysts + 7Loss + 8Increase  
                            + 9Earn_Volatility + 10Ret_Volatility + 11Firm_Size + 12Growth  
                            + 13Horizon + e1                                                                                     (1) 
 
 The dependent variable is the absolute error of a forecast for quarterly earnings issued by 
a given firm.14 If the firm issued multiple forecasts for a given quarter, we keep the first forecast.15 
The key test variable is the log of the CEO’s total network. The control variables include CEO 
characteristics (tenure and age), firm governance characteristics (institutional ownership and 
independent directors), the information environment (degree of analyst coverage), earnings 
predictability (loss, increase, and earnings volatility), overall uncertainty in the competitive 
environment (return volatility, firm size and growth), and the forecast horizon.16  If values are 
available on a quarterly basis, we measure the value for the beginning of the quarter in which the 
                                                  
14 The results are robust even after including annual forecasts as well as quarterly forecasts. 
15 We use the first forecast because it has the longest horizon and therefore requires more forward-looking information. 
In an unreported test we use the latest forecast, which presumably includes the most amount of information. The 
results are robust to using the latest forecast. 
16 In robustness tests we replace age with time to retirement to capture effects relating to the CEO’s time horizon 
incentives and replace increase over the prior quarter with increase over the same quarter of the prior year. The results 
(not reported) are qualitatively similar. 
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forecast is issued. We measure variables whose values are only available on an annual basis as of 
the year-end preceding the quarter in which the forecast is issued.  The regression also includes 
year and firm fixed effects to reduce potential biases from correlated omitted variables such as 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.  
 To investigate whether the relation differs based on the source of network contacts we 
separate the CEO’s network into separate variables based on whether the contact comes from an 
employment relation (Network_Emp), attending a common educational institution (Network_Edu), 
or affiliations with social organizations (Network_Soc). We take the log of each network variable 
(if the number of contacts for a specific network source is zero we set the value of the log variable 
to zero).  
 We report the results in Panel A of Table 4. The first column reports the results for the test 
of H1. The significantly negative coefficient (-0.030; p < 0.01) for Network_Total indicates that 
CEOs who have larger networks are able to forecast earnings more accurately. This is consistent 
with a greater number of network contacts providing information regarding the competitive 
environment to the CEO that can be used to generate a more accurate expectation of future earnings. 
To assess the economic significance we find that an increase from the bottom to the top quartile 
of Network_Total (4.595 to 6.222) reduces the mean forecast error by 13.6%. Similarly, an 
increase from the bottom to the top quartile of Network_Emp reduces the mean forecast error by 
16.8%.  
============= 
Insert Table 4 
============= 
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The results in columns 2 – 4 of Panel A of Table 4 present the results for the individual 
network source variables. Following Engelberg et al. (2013), we classify connections as coming 
from employment, educational, or social relationships. We find the coefficient for each network 
variable to be significantly negative, indicating that contacts from each source, whether from an 
employment, education, or social relationship, provides information the CEO can use to increase 
the accuracy of forecasted earnings. In the final column of Panel A of Table 4, we include the log 
of the number of contacts from each source as a separate independent variable and find that each 
is significantly negative at conventional levels. The results suggest that contacts from each type of 
relationship are useful in providing information to improve earnings expectations.  
In our main regressions we control for the CEO’s tenure and age and we control for the 
CEO’s overall ability below. However, there could still be concern that our findings are driven by 
another unobservable CEO characteristic. We therefore conduct two additional tests. First, we 
replace firm fixed effects with CEO fixed effects. This serves to control for the CEO’s average 
network size during the sample period and allows the network size variable to pick up deviations 
in the CEO’s network from the mean during the sample period. Second, we replace CEO fixed 
effects with random effects. The fixed effects assume that the CEO–specific effects are correlated 
with the independent variables whereas the random effects assume that the CEO–specific effects 
are uncorrelated with the independent variables. The results for CEO fixed effects (presented in 
Panel B of Table 4) and random effects (presented in Panel C of Table 4) are consistent with the 
main test and provide added confidence that that the observed negative relation between network 
size and forecast error is not driven by omitted CEO characteristics. 
 
Tests of the Type of Employment Contact 
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Hypotheses H2A and H2B investigate whether the impact of network contacts on forecast 
error differs based on the type of contact. Hypothesis 2A examines whether the relation differs 
based on whether the contact works in the same industry and Hypothesis 2B examines whether it 
matters whether the contact is an insider for their own firm. To test for a common industry effect 
we define two variables. Same_Industry and Different_Industry, represent the log of the number 
of contacts from firms that are in the same two-digit SIC code as the forecasting firm, and from a 
different industry, respectively.17 To test for an insider information effect we define variables 
Insider and Outsider, as the log of the number of contacts for individuals who are classified as 
insiders for their employer firms, i.e., executive officers and senior managers, and the log of all 
other employment contacts, respectively.  
============= 
Insert Table 5 
============= 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for the test of H2A relating to the industry of the 
employment contact. We find the coefficient for Same_Industry to be significantly negative, while 
the coefficient for Different_Industry is not significant. In addition, we find the coefficients to be 
significantly different (p < 0.01). When we include both variables in the regression, we find similar 
results with Same_Industry being significantly negatively related to forecast error, and 
Different_Industry remaining insignificant. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients are 
significantly different (p < 0.01). Overall, the results are consistent with network contacts 
providing industry-related information useful for forecasting future earnings.  
                                                  
17 To prevent losing network contacts due to missing industry codes we assume the proportion of “same” versus 
“different” industry contacts is constant for contacts without an industry code. We complement this assumption by 
using “sector” information in the BoardEx, because all contacts have sector information. The results using sector 
instead of two-digit SIC are robust. 
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the results for the test of H2B relating to the insider status of 
the contact. In the separate regressions we find that the coefficient for the log of insider contacts 
(Insider) is significantly negative (-0.023; p < 0.01), while the log of outsider contacts (Outsider) 
is insignificant. When we include both variables in the regression, we find similar results with the 
coefficient of Insider being significantly negative, and the coefficient for Outsider remaining 
insignificant. In addition, we find the coefficients to be significantly different (p < 0.10). Taken 
together, these results suggest that the information gathered from individuals who have a more in 
depth knowledge of their competitive environment is more useful in reducing forecast error. 
 
Tests of Underlying Conditions 
Hypotheses 3A, 3B and 3C examine whether information from external sources is more 
useful under certain economic conditions. Hypothesis 3A investigates whether the impact of CEO 
network contacts on forecasting accuracy is greater when a firm’s earnings are more closely tied 
to industry and economy-wide earnings and less idiosyncratic. To investigate this hypothesis we 
compute the Pearson correlation between the firm’s return on equity and the mean return on equity 
for firms in the same SIC two-digit industry, or Compustat sample, over the prior sixteen quarters. 
We then interact the correlation with our main interest variable, Network_Emp to examine whether 
the network effect of reducing forecast error will increase as a firm’s earnings are highly associated 
with industry and economy-wide earnings.  
We report the results of systematic or idiosyncratic earnings in Table 6. The coefficients 
for the interactions between Network_Emp and both correlation measures Ind._Earn_Corr (p < 
0.05) and Mkt._ Earn_Corr (p < 0.01) are significantly negative. These results support the 
contention that a broader set of network contacts provides the CEO with information on industry 
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trends and macro economy trends that allows the CEO to improve their expectation of earnings if 
their firm’s earnings are more closely tied to overall economic performance. 
Hypothesis 3B investigates whether external information sources are more important when 
there is a greater degree of underlying uncertainty. We use the dispersion in analyst forecast to 
measure the extent of underlying uncertainty and define an indicator variable equal to one if it is 
in the highest dispersion quintile or decile. To examine the impact of uncertainty on the value of 
external information we interact the indicator variable with the log of the CEO’s employment 
network contacts. We measure analyst dispersion as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts.18 
We present the results in Panel B of Table 6. We find significantly negative coefficients 
for the interaction of each dispersion indicator variable with the CEO’s employment network. We 
also find that the magnitude of the effect and the level of significance are greater for the dispersion 
decile variable than the quintile indicator variable. This suggests the impact of the CEO’s network 
contacts on forecast accuracy is most important when underlying uncertainty is especially high. In 
other words, CEOs can generally rely on their internal information sources to form their earnings 
expectations. However, when their earnings are especially sensitive to underlying economic 
conditions, they are more likely to reach out to, and incorporate information from, external sources 
to improve their earnings forecasts.  
Hypothesis 3C investigates whether the impact of external information sources on forecast 
accuracy is greater when the firm operates in a competitive industry. To measure competition we 
construct a “fluidity” variable that is based on a textual analysis of the firm’s business in the firm’s 
10-K filing (Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala 2014). Fluidity is greater when the firm’s product words 
                                                  
18 We require at least 2 analysts to calculate the standard deviation and use the most recent analysts forecasts prior to 
the management forecast. 
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overlap more with the vector of product words used by rivals. A higher degree of overlap indicates 
a higher competitive threat from rivals. As with uncertainty, we define indicator variables that are 
set equal to one if the firm’s industry is in the highest competition quintile, or decile, respectively.  
We present the results in Panel C of Table 6. The results support the contention that external 
information is most valuable in reducing forecast error when competition is high. As before we 
find that both the magnitude of the coefficient and level of significance are higher for the decile 
indicator variable than the quintile variable, which is consistent with external information being 
most valuable when the industry competition is very high. 
 
 
============= 
Insert Table 6 
============= 
Additional Tests:  
Controlling for CEO’s Overall Ability 
Given Baik et al.’s (2011) finding that CEO’s with higher overall ability are able to forecast 
more accurately, we follow their procedure and use the CEO ability values from Peter Demerjian’s 
web site to control for CEO ability on a subsample of our observations. Demerjian’s procedure 
uses data envelope analysis to estimate the efficient frontier linking inputs to outputs and assesses 
the distance of each firm from the efficient frontier.19  
                                                  
19 Additional details can be found in Demerjian et al. (2012).  In their procedure, the output is sales and the inputs are 
cost of goods sold, sales, general and administrative expenses, property, plant and equipment, operating leases, 
research and development expenditures, goodwill, and other intangible assets. 
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Panel A of Table 7 provides data on the network size variables for CEOs with above and 
below median ability. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that lower ability CEOs tend to have larger 
networks, i.e., ability and network size are negatively correlated. Thus, it does not appear as though 
network size is a proxy for CEO ability in explaining management forecast error.  
To formally control for the effect of CEO ability we estimate the following regression: 
Forecast_Error = 0 + 1Network_Total + 2Network_Total*Ability + 3Ability  
                            + 4Tenure + 5Age+ 6Inst_Own + 7Ind_Directors  
                            + 8Num_Analysts + 9Loss + 10Increase + 11Earn_Volatility  
                            + 12Ret_Volatility + 13Firm_Size + 14Growth + 15Horizon + e2        (2) 
 
In addition to controlling for CEO ability through the Ability direct effect, the interaction 
term with network size allows us to examine whether there is difference in how high and low 
ability CEOs are able to utilize their networks to improve their forecast accuracy. A negative 
coefficient would support a complementary relation in that CEOs with higher ability are better 
able to use the information from the network to reduce forecast error. A positive coefficient would 
support a substitute relation in that, the information gained from outside network contacts has a 
smaller impact on the accuracy of the forecast for CEOs with higher overall ability. 
We report the results from the estimation of regression equation (2) in Panel B of Table 7.  
For brevity we do not report the results for the full set of control variables. We find that the 
coefficients of the CEO network variables are significantly negative. This provides evidence that 
our prior findings are robust to controlling for CEO ability. We also find that the coefficient of 
each CEO network variable interacted with CEO ability is significantly positive. These results are 
consistent with a substitution effect whereby the information provided through the CEOs external 
network has a smaller effect on the accuracy of the earnings forecast if the CEO has high overall 
managerial ability.   
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============= 
Insert Table 7 
============= 
Two-stage Instrumental Variable Approach 
The extent to which a CEO’s network represents a choice variable, either by the individual 
or the board, is not clear. The CEO’s network is determined by a number of factors, some of which 
can be influenced by the CEO’s decisions, and some that are not.  For example, the individual can 
choose to become involved in a social organization or choose to serve as an outside board member 
for a public company. On the other hand, the individual may have no control over whether other 
graduates from their alma mater rise to become executive officers.  Similarly, while the board may 
consider the CEO’s network in appointing the CEO it is not clear whether this is a first order effect 
and a CEO’s network is likely to change over time for reasons over which the board has no control. 
The possibility that the CEO network reflects choices creates the potential for endogeneity 
and potential bias from correlated omitted variables. To alleviate this concern, we use an 
instrumental variable two-stage approach. In the first-stage we estimate a regression with the 
CEO’s network size as the dependent variable and use the industry average CEO network size as 
our instrument.20 Our choice is based on the theory that firms follow an industry norm, and 
interlocking practices between CEOs would give more opportunity to build networks within their 
industry if CEOs, in general have broader networks. On the other hand, we do not expect industry 
average networks to affect firm forecast accuracy. The predicted CEO network size from the first 
                                                  
20 We also use the industry mean number of outside board members as both an alternative, and as an additional, 
instrumental variable. The theory underlying this instrument is that the greater the industry utilizes outside board 
members, the greater the opportunities for the CEO to generate a broader network. The results are consistent with 
those reported using the industry average network. Because the weak instrument test (see below) indicates that the 
industry average network is a stronger instrument, for brevity we do not report the results of the alternative tests. 
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stage becomes the regression is the test variable in the second stage. Because the test variable is 
determined solely by the variables identified in the first stage, it is less likely to reflect 
unobservable factors that are correlated with management forecast accuracy. 
============= 
Insert Table 8 
============= 
We report the findings in Table 8. Consistent with prior findings we find a significantly 
negative coefficient for the instrumental variable in the second stage. This result provides 
additional evidence that larger CEO networks facilitate the transfer of information that the 
individual can use to form a more accurate forecast of future earnings.    
To validate our choice of the industry average network as an instrument we follow Larcker 
and Rusticus (2010) and conduct weak instrument identification and Hausman specification tests. 
The partial R2 of the first stage regression is 7.8% and partial F is 1670. The Cragg-Donald Wald 
F statistic is 1585, which exceeds the 10% (25%) critical value of 16.4 (5.5) based on Stock and 
Yogo (2005). Overall, the results suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests by 
explaining a significant amount of the CEO’s network size. The Hausman test yields a Wu-
Hausman F value of 15.7 (p < 0.01). This test supports the contention that the instrumental variable 
improves the specification over the OLS estimation.21  
 
 
 
                                                  
21 We do not conduct an over-identification test (Larcker and Rusticus 2010) because we only employ one instrumental 
variable. 
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Non-Linear Threshold Approach 
We further explore the relation between the network size and forecast accuracy by 
examining whether there is a threshold effect. Specifically, while the prior finding suggests that 
there is a negative effect between the number of the CEO’s network contacts and forecast error it 
isn’t clear whether the relation increases monotonically throughout the distribution, i.e., whether 
the incremental effect of an additional contact is constant. To investigate this issue we separate the 
number of network contacts into quartiles and define indicator variables set equal to one for 
observations in each quartile of the distribution. We present the results in Table 9. We find a 
significantly negative coefficient for the highest quartile (-0.013; p < 0.01).  This is consistent with 
a threshold effect whereby the CEO needs to have a fairly large network in order to obtain 
information that is useful in setting expectations for future earnings. This suggests that CEOs who 
have broad networks are able to aggregate information from a variety of sources to develop a more 
accurate picture of the economic environment faced by the firm. 
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 In this study we document evidence that large CEO networks are associated with lower 
management forecast error and that this result holds for all network sources (employment, 
education, and social). Our findings also indicate that contacts from the same industry and from 
individuals who serve as insiders for their own firm have the greatest impact on forecast error, 
which suggests that the most valuable information provides managers with a more accurate view 
of the industry’s competitive environment. In addition, we find that the negative relation between 
CEO network size and management forecast error is strongest when earnings are more systematic 
and less idiosyncratic, when underlying uncertainty is high, or industry competition is high. These 
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results provide evidence that the external information provides CEOs with better forecasts of 
industry, or overall economic trends. 
 Overall, our findings provide insight into the manner in which external information sources 
complement a firm’s internal information system to develop accurate forecasts of future earnings. 
Specifically, our evidence suggests that having a large number of contacts with individuals from 
the same industry, or with insider knowledge, provides CEOs with information about industry and 
macro-economic trends that allows CEOs, particularly those with lower ability, to improve their 
earnings forecasts.   
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APPENDIX A 
Description of the BoardEx Database 
 
To construct their database, BoardEx begins with all publicly listed companies and then adds in the most notable and most requested 
private companies.  The database includes over 18,000 companies. For each company they obtain the full list of board members, senior 
managers and disclosed earners. They then use C.V.’s to develop each individual’s employment history, educational background, and 
affiliation with foundations, charitable organizations, etc.  
 
Although the BoardEx database includes a “Network Size” variable, we calculate the network size for each CEO from their network 
database. This procedure allows us to calculate the sub-category network size variables and allows the network size to vary over time. 
Although BoardEx has a senior manager database, we restrict our analysis to the director database because most CEOs are executive 
directors as opposed to senior managers. 
 
A CEO’s network includes individuals who are not affiliated with the CEO’s firm, outside directors for the CEO’s firm, and executives 
and managers of the CEO’s firm who serve as outside directors for other firms. Because all of these contacts represent access to 
information from external sources, we include all of the contacts in our measure. As a sensitivity test we exclude contacts with individuals 
with ties to the CEO’s own firm and the results are qualitatively similar.  
 
As an example, consider former Quantum CEO Rick Belluzzo. In our study his network size is 978 (all employment related). In addition 
to being CEO of Quantum, Mr. Belluzzo has served on the board of Imation, PMC-Sierra, JDS Uniphase, Silicon Graphics, Proxima, 
and Specialty Laboratories. Prior to becoming CEO of Quantum, Mr. Belluzzo worked for Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard. His network 
consists of external network of 948 contacts from the current and past director positions and individuals with whom he worked with in 
his previous positions with other firms and internal network of 30 contacts from Quantum. 
 
We use the following diagram to illustrate the construction of the employment network variable. As you can see, Mr. Belluzzo’s network 
consists of all of the executive officers and directors for Quantum during Mr. Belluzzo’s tenure as CEO. In addition, Mr. Belluzzo served 
as an outside board member for JDS Uniphase. His network therefore includes all of the executive officers and directors, including the 
CEO, that were present during his tenure as an outside board member. Finally, Mr. Belluzzo worked for Microsoft from 1999 – 2002 as 
a group V.P. and President. Therefore, his network includes Microsoft’s executive officers and directors for that time period. 
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram of CEO Network Connections 
 

 33
 
APPENDIX B  
 Variable Definitions 
(Continued on next page) 
Variable  Definitions  Data Source      
Forecast Error = The absolute value of forecast error deflated by price (i.e., 
|actual earnings less management forecast| / price), 
multiplied by 100 
 
FirstCall 
Network Variables      
Network_Total = The log of summation of Network_Employment, 
Network_Education, and Network_Social 
 
BoardEx 
Network_Emp = The log of summation of the CEO's employment ties. An 
employment tie occurs if the CEO currently or has 
historically overlapped with another executive or director 
 
BoardEx 
Network_Edu = The log of summation of the CEO’s educational ties. An 
educational tie occurs if the CEO went to the same university 
at the same time with another executive or director 
 
BoardEx 
Network_Soc = The log of summation of the CEO’s social ties. A social tie 
occurs if the CEO participated in a same organization (e.g., 
charity or recreational club) at the same time with another 
executive or director 
 
BoardEx 
Same_Industry = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties to 
individuals who are affiliated with firms in the same 2-digit 
SIC 
 
BoardEx, 
Compustat 
Different_Industry = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties to 
individuals affiliated with firms that are not in the same 2-
digit SIC 
 
BoardEx, 
Compustat 
Insider = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties 
with individuals who are classified as executive 
directors and non-board managers such as CEO, COO, 
CFO, President, Vice-President, or Division Manager  
 
BoardEx 
Outsider = The log of summation of the CEO’s employment ties 
with non-executive directors who are typically 
classified as an independent outsider 
 
BoardEx 
Network_Quartile2 = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s network is 
in the second quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise  
BoardEx 
Network_Quartile3 = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s network is 
in the third quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise 
 BoardEx 
Network_Quartile4 = An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s network is 
in the fourth quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise 
 BoardEx 
Conditioning Variables     
Ability = The DEA score based on the measure developed in 
Demerjian et al. (2012b) 
 Demerjian’s 
web site 
Ind._Earn_Corr = Correlation of ROE changes between the firm and industry 
(at SIC2) level. 
 Compustat 
Mkt._Earn_Corr = Correlation  of ROE changes between the firm and market 
level. 
 Compustat 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Definitions  Data Source      
     
Conditioning Variables (continued)   
Uncertainty = Uncertainty is measured as the standard deviation in analyst 
forecasts. We define an indicator variable equal to one if it is 
in the highest dispersion quintile or decile. 
 
IBES 
Competition = Fluidity based on the overlap of product words in the firm’s 
business description from their 10-K filing described in 
detail in Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014). We define an 
indicator variable equal to one if it is in the highest dispersion 
quintile or decile. 
 
Hoberg and 
Phillips’ Data 
Library 
     
Control Variables      
Tenure = The number of years that the CEO has held the position of 
chief executive officer 
 
BoardEx 
Age = The age of the CEO from the BoardEx database  BoardEx 
Inst_Own = The percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of 
the quarter t 
 
Thompson & 
Reuters 
Ind_Directors = The number of independent directors scaled by the total 
number of directors in the board of the firm 
 
BoardEx 
#Analyst = The number of analysts following the firm in the current 
quarter 
 
FirstCall  
Loss = 1 if the firm’s current earnings is negative, and 0 otherwise  Compustat 
Increase = 1 if the firm’s current earnings increased compared to the 
previous quarters’ earnings, and 0 otherwise 
 
Compustat 
Earn_Volatility = The standard deviation of quarterly earnings scaled by the 
total assets over the past 4 years 
 
Compustat 
Ret_Volatility = The standard deviation of daily raw stock returns over the 
last three years 
 CRSP 
Firm Size = Total assets in the beginning of the quarter t  Compustat 
Growth = The market-to-book ratio measured by the market value of 
common equity scaled by book value of common equity in 
the beginning of the quarter.  
 
Compustat  
Horizon = The number of days between the forecast date and the 
earnings announcement date 
 FirstCall 
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TABLE 1  
Network Size  
Panel A: Mean Values for Each Network Size Quartile and Aggregate Statistics 
Variable Low Q2 Q3 High Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Network_Total 53.22 156.02 347.22 921.62 369.2 225.0 399.0 
Network_Emp 44.01 99.54 219.09 682.09 261.0 122.0 334.4 
Network_Edu 8.86 55.32 124.62 219.23 101.9 46.0 141.1 
Network_Soc 0.35 1.16 3.51 20.30 6.3 0.0 40.2 
Same_Industry 38.80 75.71 144.09 444.70 147.5 62.0 227.0 
Different_Industry 3.34 17.82 56.40 247.44 64.5 0.0 197.2 
Insiders 32.59 78.96 189.64 639.79 235.1 97.0 322.7 
Outsiders 11.42 20.58 29.45 42.30 25.9 19.0 22.4 
Industry Leaders 27.83 81.50 187.25 587.68 221.3 101.0 300.7 
Industry Non-leaders 16.12 18.15 31.95 56.80 30.8 0.0 80.4 
 
Panel B: Proportional Number of Firms the CEO Has Worked for by Network Size Quartile 
 Low Q2 Q3 High 
1 firm 14.4% 0.7% 0.1% 0.8% 
2 firms 24.5% 9.4% 3.2% 1.1% 
3 firms or more 61.1% 89.8% 96.8% 98.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Panel C: Proportion of Board Memberships by Network Size Quartile 
 Low Q2 Q3 High 
No position 55.2% 38.1% 30.2% 18.3% 
1 position 32.5% 29.4% 26.0% 26.9% 
2 positions or more 12.3% 32.5% 43.8% 54.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Panel D: Proportion of Graduate Degrees Held by CEO by Network Size Quartile 
Variable Low Q2 Q3 High 
No graduate degree 90.5% 74.6% 58.8% 48.2% 
1 graduate degree 8.4% 23.3% 35.6% 38.9% 
2 graduate degrees or more 1.1% 2.1% 5.6% 12.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of main interest network variables. Panel A presents the mean network 
contacts by network size quartile as well as basic descriptive statistics. Panel B, C, and D provides proportion of 
number of firms, board memberships, and graduate degrees by network size quartile. In Panel B, we count the 
number of companies each CEO worked for in the past or is working for currently in any capacity (i.e. executives 
or managers). The number of companies is calculated using firms in the BoardEx network data. In calculating 
board membership in Panel C, we count the number of director positions each CEO served in the past or is serving 
currently on boards of directors. A description of each variable can be found in Appendix B.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
Panel A: Complete Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Forecast Error 19,636 0.361 0.750 0.049 0.136 0.346 
Tenure 19,636 4.926 4.650 1.500 3.500 6.900 
Age 19,636 53.878 7.364 49.000 54.000 59.000 
Inst_Own 19,636 0.614 0.326 0.447 0.710 0.852 
Ind_Directors 19,636 0.743 0.134 0.667 0.750 0.857 
#Analyst 19,636 9.332 6.427 5.000 8.000 13.000 
Loss 19,636 0.182 0.386 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Increase 19,636 0.546 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Earn_Volatility 19,636 0.022 0.027 0.007 0.013 0.027 
Ret_Volatility 19,636 0.031 0.012 0.022 0.029 0.037 
Firm Size 19,636 6,045 40,415 355 1,000 3,362 
Growth 19,636 3.258 2.875 1.554 2.399 3.817 
Horizon 19,636 82.894 25.390 83.000 91.000 94.000 
 
Panel B: Mean Values for Each Network Size Quartile 
Variable Low Q2 Q3 High High - Low 
Forecast Error 0.416 0.360 0.386 0.280 -0.136*** 
Tenure 5.264 4.696 4.925 4.817 -0.446*** 
Age 54.755 53.703 53.928 53.121 -1.634*** 
Inst_Own 0.593 0.624 0.620 0.620 0.028*** 
Ind_Directors 0.699 0.739 0.756 0.778 0.079*** 
#Analyst 7.189 8.883 9.604 11.662 4.473*** 
Loss 0.185 0.173 0.205 0.165 -0.021*** 
Increase 0.531 0.546 0.546 0.560 0.030*** 
Earn_Volatility 0.021 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.000 
Ret_Volatility 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 -0.003*** 
Firm Size 1,268 2,894 5,374 14,662 13,394*** 
Growth 2.826 3.104 3.530 3.576 0.750*** 
Horizon 82.244 82.846 81.587 84.903 2.659*** 
 
This table reports the correlations between the variables used in the regression analyses. A description of each 
variable can be found in the Appendix B. 
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TABLE 3  
Key Pairwise Correlations  
 
  
Forecast_ 
Error 
Network_ 
Total 
Network_ 
Emp 
Network_ 
Edu 
Network_ 
Soc 
Forecast Error  1.000         
           
Network_Total -0.056 1.000       
 <.0001         
Network_Emp -0.049 0.875 1.000     
 <.0001 <.0001       
Network_Edu -0.048 0.627 0.291 1.000   
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
Network_Soc -0.032 0.257 0.223 0.114 1.000 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
Tenure -0.022 -0.035 -0.072 0.043 0.041 
 0.002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Age -0.001 -0.061 -0.015 -0.086 0.062 
 0.916 <.0001 0.033 <.0001 <.0001 
Inst_Own -0.069 0.033 0.032 0.027 0.001 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.905 
Ind_Directors -0.004 0.239 0.247 0.128 0.104 
 0.605 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
#Analyst -0.160 0.272 0.303 0.091 0.122 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Loss 0.229 -0.012 -0.004 -0.019 -0.066 
 <.0001 0.106 0.533 0.007 <.0001 
Increase 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.008 -0.012 
 0.031 0.005 0.015 0.288 0.096 
Earn_Volatility 0.122 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 -0.088 
 <.0001 0.841 0.144 0.710 <.0001 
Ret_Volatility 0.141 -0.123 -0.145 -0.054 -0.139 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Firm Size -0.120 0.366 0.408 0.162 0.287 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Growth -0.124 0.102 0.095 0.049 0.023 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.002 
Horizon 0.086 0.036 0.039 0.007 -0.016 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.298 0.022 
 
This table reports the correlations between the variables used in the regression analyses. A description of each 
variable can be found in the Appendix B. For brevity, we suppress the correlations between the control 
variables and focus on the correlations for the dependent variable and the key test variables of interest.  The 
additional correlations are available from the authors upon request.    
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TABLE 4 
Network Size and Management Forecast Error 
Panel A: Total Network Size by Source of the Network Contact  
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error (4) Forecast Error (5) Forecast Error 
Network_Total -0.030***     
 (0.003)     
Network_Emp  -0.034***   -0.027*** 
  (0.001)   (0.007) 
Network_Edu   -0.015***  -0.012*** 
   (0.001)  (0.007) 
Network_Soc    -0.027*** -0.024*** 
    (0.001) (0.002) 
Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.078 -0.085 -0.075 -0.092 -0.083 
 (0.295) (0.255) (0.317) (0.218) (0.268) 
#Analyst -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.117*** 1.102*** 1.117*** 1.078*** 1.103*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 1.928** 1.952** 1.901** 1.920** 2.037** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) 
Firm Size -0.182*** -0.180*** -0.183*** -0.185*** -0.180*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 19,636 19,636 19,636 19,636 19,636 
R-squared 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425 0.425 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
p-value in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: CEO Fixed Effects 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error (4) Forecast Error 
Network_Total -0.079**    
 (0.012)    
Network_Emp  -0.077***   
  (0.006)   
Network_Edu   -0.084***  
   (0.000)  
Network_Soc    -0.048*** 
    (0.000) 
Tenure -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) 
Age 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.012 
 (0.506) (0.464) (0.421) (0.490) 
Inst_Own -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ind_Directors -0.078 -0.00083 -0.088 -0.091 
 (0.372) (0.343) (0.314) (0.299) 
#Analyst -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.249*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.076*** 1.094*** 1.013*** 1.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ret_Volatility 1.246 1.293 1.278 1.284 
 (0.201) (0.185) (0.189) (0.187) 
Firm Size -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.179*** -0.185*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 19,636 19,636 19,636 19,636 
R-squared 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.477 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
p-value in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: CEO Random Effects 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error (4) Forecast Error 
Network_Total -0.020**    
 (0.018)    
Network_Emp  -0.021**   
  (0.014)   
Network_Edu   -0.013***  
   (0.001)  
Network_Soc    -0.017** 
    (0.020) 
Tenure -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.014 
 (0.973) (0.936) (0.993) (0.825) 
#Analyst -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.139*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.289*** 0.289*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.522*** 1.512*** 1.522*** 1.494*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 2.411*** 2.428*** 2.375*** 2.365*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm Size -0.025*** -0.025** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) 
Growth -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 19,636 19,636 19,636 19,636 
R-squared 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.101 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 
This table reports the results for an OLS regression examining the effect of network size on absolute forecast 
error. Descriptions of each variable can be found in the Appendix B.  The sample includes 19,636 quarterly 
management forecasts. (*** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.01; ** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.05; * Significant 
at two-tailed p < 0.10.) Our main result is robust under CEO fixed effects and random fixed effects.  
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TABLE 5  
The Source of Knowledge Spillover effect of CEO Network on Management Forecast 
Panel A: The Effect of Industry Knowledge on Forecast Errors  
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error 
Same_Industry -0.063***  -0.065*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Different_Industry  -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.630) (0.333) 
Network_Edu -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Network_Soc -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.284) (0.293) (0.317) 
Age 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inst_Own -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.071*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Ind_Directors -0.173* -0.147 -0.167 
 (0.089) (0.149) (0.101) 
#Analyst -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.126*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.319*** 0.317*** 0.319*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 0.170 0.191 0.182 
 (0.675) (0.637) (0.653) 
Ret_Volatility 4.316*** 4.435*** 4.330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size -0.243*** -0.249*** -0.243*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Observations 12,831 12,831 12,831 
R-squared 0.443 0.443 0.443 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
p-value in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Insider Knowledge on Forecast Errors 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error 
Insider -0.023**  -0.027*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Outsider  -0.007 0.009 
  (0.558) (0.490) 
Network_Edu -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Network_Soc -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.084 -0.079 -0.088 
 (0.261) (0.292) (0.239) 
#Analyst -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.102*** 1.101*** 1.100*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 2.035** 1.960** 2.051** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) 
Firm Size -0.180*** -0.183*** -0.180*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Observations 19,636 19,636 19,636 
R-squared 0.425 0.425 0.425 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
This table reports the results for an OLS regression examining the source of knowledge spillover effect of 
CEO network. Panel A provides industry knowledge effect and Panel B presents insider knowledge effect. 
Descriptions of each variable can be found in the Appendix B.  (*** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.01; ** 
Significant at two-tailed p < 0.05; * Significant at two-tailed p < 0.10.)  
 
 43
 
TABLE 6  
Cross Sectional Tests Across Underlying Economic Conditions 
Panel A: Systematic versus Idiosyncratic Earnings 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Forecast Error Forecast Error 
Network_Emp -0.023** -0.029*** 
 (0.022) (0.004) 
Network_Emp*Ind._Earn_Corr -0.030**  
 (0.047)  
Network_Emp*Mkt._Earn_Corr  -0.048*** 
  (0.003) 
Ind._Earn_Corr 0.170**  
 (0.023)  
Mkt._Earn_Corr  0.259*** 
  (0.001) 
Network_Edu -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Network_Soc -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.186) (0.180) 
#Analyst -0.111*** -0.110*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.276*** 0.276*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.048*** 1.109*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 1.936** 1.872** 
 (0.023) (0.028) 
Firm Size -0.184*** -0.181*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 19,341 19,341 
R-squared 0.427 0.427 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
p-value in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Underlying Uncertainty 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error 
Network_Emp -0.024** -0.026** 
 (0.015) (0.010) 
Network_Emp*Dispersion_Quintile -0.023*  
 (0.064)  
Network_Emp*Dispersion_Decile  -0.044*** 
  (0.010) 
Dispersion_Quintile 0.261***  
 (0.000)  
Dispersion_Decile  0.405*** 
  (0.000) 
Loss 0.257*** 0.261*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Network_Edu -0.012*** -0.011** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Network_Soc -0.025*** -0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.056*** -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Ind_Directors -0.059 -0.067 
 (0.422) (0.363) 
#_analyst -0.121*** -0.116*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.108*** 1.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 1.417* 1.313 
 (0.089) (0.115) 
Firm Size -0.198*** -0.200*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 19,345 19,345 
R-squared 0.431 0.431 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
p-value in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Competition 
 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error 
Network_Emp -0.022** -0.023** 
 (0.036) (0.023) 
Network_Emp*Competition_Quintile -0.027**  
 (0.041)  
Network_Emp*Competition_Decile  -0.046** 
  (0.012) 
Competition_Quintile 0.118*  
 (0.087)  
Competition_Decile  0.250*** 
  (0.008) 
Loss 0.280*** 0.280*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Network_Edu -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Network_Soc -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.066 -0.067 
 (0.387) (0.380) 
#_analyst -0.110*** -0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.022*** 0.974*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Ret_Volatility 2.093** 1.981** 
 (0.015) (0.021) 
Firm Size -0.186*** -0.187*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 19,188 19,188 
R-squared 0.408 0.408 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
 
This table reports the results for an OLS regression examining underlying economic conditions where external 
information is more beneficial. Panel A provides the results related to systematic and idiosyncratic earnings that are 
proxied by Ind._Earn_corr (Mkt._Earn_Corr). Ind._Earn_corr (Mkt._Earn_Corr) denotes the correlation of ROE 
changes between the firm and industry at SIC2 level (Market level). Panel B presents underlying uncertainty effects and 
Panel C provides competition effects. Descriptions of each variable can be found in the Appendix B. (*** Significant at 
two-tailed p < 0.01; ** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.05; * Significant at two-tailed p < 0.10.)   
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TABLE 7  
Controlling for CEO Ability  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics depending on Ability 
  Low Ability High Ability 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
(1) Network_Total 387 246 323 201 
(2) Network_Emp 275 129 221 104 
(3) Network_Edu 107 52 98 45 
(4) Network_Soc 5 0 4 0 
(5) Same_Industry 144 61 127 55 
(6) Different_Industry 70 0 51 0 
(7) Insider 250 105 198 82 
(8) Outsider 24 18 24 18 
(9) Same_Industry_Percent 83% 100% 85% 100% 
(10) Insider_Percent 83% 84% 81% 82% 
(11) Director positions 1.6 1 1.4 1 
(12) Networks through outside director 
positions 
173 51 137 31 
(12) Networks through main firm 42 32 42 31 
(13) Current Directors in the CEO firm 9 8 9 8 
(14) Companies CEO work for 5 5 5 4 
 
Panel B: Interaction with CEO Ability 
VARIABLES (1) Forecast Error (2) Forecast Error (3) Forecast Error (4) Forecast Error 
Network_Emp -0.040***   -0.033*** 
 (0.000)   (0.004) 
Network_Emp*Ability 0.218***   0.191*** 
 (0.000)   (0.001) 
Network_Edu  -0.021***  -0.016*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Network_Edu*Ability  0.079***  0.056* 
  (0.006)  (0.055) 
Network_Soc   -0.038*** -0.036*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Network_Soc*Ability   0.033 0.020 
   (0.596) (0.753) 
Ability -1.257*** -0.460*** -0.193*** -1.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
     
Observations 15,671 15,671 15,671 15,671 
R-squared 0.444 0.443 0.443 0.445 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
 
This table reports the results for an OLS regression examining an interaction effect between CEO network and ability. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics based on the sample median of CEO ability. Panel B provides an OLS 
regression with Forecast Error as the dependent variable. Descriptions of each variable can be found in the Appendix 
B. (*** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.01; ** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.05; * Significant at two-tailed p < 0.10)  
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TABLE 8 
2 Stage Regression Using Instrument Variables 
 
 
1st Stage 
Dep = Network_Total 
2nd Stage 
Dep = Forecast_Error 
Network_Total  -0.091*** 
  (0.000) 
Ind_Network_Total 0.834***  
 (0.000)  
Tenure -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.007*** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.026) 
Inst_Own -0.065*** -0.084*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Ind_Directors 1.383*** 0.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
#Analyst 0.103*** -0.120*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Loss 0.161*** 0.401*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Increase 0.042*** 0.087*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 2.010*** 1.777*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 3.460*** 3.744*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.274*** 0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Growth 0.033*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizon 0.001*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
R squared 27.8% 9.03% 
Partial F-statistic Fp = 1670.01 (p < 0.001) 
Partial R2 R2 = 7.8% 
  
Weak identification 
test 
Cragg-Donald Wald F = 1585.6 
Stock-Yogo critical values: 10% maximal IV size 16.38 
                                             25% maximal IV size 5.53 
  
Hausman test F=15.7 (p = 0.000) 
 
This table presents the results from a two-stage regression using the industry average CEO total network size 
as the instrumental variable. In the first-stage regression the dependent variable is the CEO’s network size. 
In the second-stage regression the management forecast error is the dependent variable and the predicted 
value of CEO network size as the test variable. The results are robust even when we run the same IV 
regression on the sub-components of CEO’s total network: Employment, Education, and Social.  
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TABLE 9 
Network Effects by Quartiles 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Forecast Error 
Network_Quartile2 -0.002 
 (0.732) 
Network_Quartile3 -0.002 
 (0.561) 
Network_Quartile4 -0.013*** 
 (0.002) 
Tenure -0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
Age 0.005*** 
 (0.000) 
Inst_Own -0.066*** 
 (0.000) 
Ind_Directors -0.086 
 (0.251) 
#Analyst -0.112*** 
 (0.000) 
Loss 0.272*** 
 (0.000) 
Increase 0.075*** 
 (0.000) 
Earn_Volatility 1.075*** 
 (0.000) 
Ret_Volatility 1.970** 
 (0.019) 
Firm Size -0.184*** 
 (0.000) 
Growth -0.038*** 
 (0.000) 
Horizon 0.004*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Observations 19,636 
R-squared 0.425 
Year FE YES 
Firm FE YES 
 
This table reports the results for an OLS regression examining the effect of network linearity on absolute 
forecast error. Descriptions of each variable can be found in the Appendix B.  (*** Significant at two-tailed p 
< 0.01; ** Significant at two-tailed p < 0.05; * Significant at two-tailed p < 0.10.)  
